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that animals' interests are qualitatively less important
than those of humans or even that animals' interests
are not morally significant at all. While we should not
gratuitously cause them suffering, we may use them
as we wish in order to benefit ourselves. In contrast to
utilitarian defenders of meat eating, I call this second
group "human supremacists."
My goal in this paper is to argue that neither type of
defense of meat eating is successful against Singer's
utilitarian argument for vegetarianism. Instead of
attempting a comprehensive response to all defenses
that fall into these two categories, I will focus on what
I consider to be the most powerful, representative ones.
I have confined myself to Singer's argument for the
strategic reason that it requires only that we extend
moral concern to all sentient beings. Sceptics are more
likely to grant this premise than they are to accept
Regan's persuasively argued but more controversial
view that all animals have an intrinsic value that may
not be sacrificed in the course of utilitarian caIculations.4

1. Types of Opposition to Vegetarianism
Although supporters of vegetarianism (and animals'
interests in general) come in many varieties, we may
distinguish two groups. First, utilitarians such as Singer
base their argument on the suffering that factory farming
causes to nonhumans and the absence of comparable
benefits to humans. l Second, the animal rights view, as
expressed by Regan, extends Kant's respect for persons
principle to include nonhumans and argues that meat
eating wrongly treats nonhumans merely as means. 2
Similarly, I find it useful to distinguish two types
of defense of meat eating. My division is based on
how each group responds to Singer's demand that we
extend the equal consideration of interests principle3
to include nonhumans and to his parallel between
speciesism and, on the other hand, racism and sexism.
Some grant Singer's premise that nonhumans do
deserve equal consideration of interests, but they argue
either that animals actually benefit from being raised
on farms or that their suffering is outweighed by
human gains. Others, paralleling Regan's rights
approach, reject utilitarian calculations of interests.
However, they argue, in direct opposition to Regan,
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2. Utilitarian Defenses of Meat Eating
In this section, I am interested in those who try to justify
meat eating on Singer's own utilitarian terms. They
agree, that is, that to attempt to justify meat eating by
simply asserting that humans are superior to nonhumans
is speciesist and that it is incumbent on them to explain
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Frey argues that the concerned individual's tactic is
sufficiently effective in reducing animals' suffering to
justify continuing to raise animals for meat. lbroughout
his book, Frey takes advantage of a concession that
Singer makes: the equal consideration of interests
principle does not necessarily condemn all meat
farming, since animals raised on free range farms (and,
we may suppose, on the kind of refOlmed farms that
Frey proposes? may avoid much of the suffering for
which Singer condemns factory farms. However, Singer
questions whether even free range farms would reduce
animals' suffering to a level that would be outweighed
by humans' gains and whether, even if they did so, they
would be economically feasible. 8 Moreover, he points
out that the pertinent issue is whether we may eat today s
meat, most of which is raised on factory farms. 9 In any
event, even ifFrey were able to show that the concerned
individual's tactic and vegetarianism would have
equally good consequences for the animals, his
argument for continuing to raise animals for meat would
still depend on showing that doing so would have better
consequences for humans than vegetarianism.
Before we tum to Frey's answer to this challenge,
let us examine another utilitarian defense of meat eating
that goes even further than Frey's and argues that our
practice of raising animals on farms benefits the animals
themselves. Farm animals have become domesticated,
so the argument goes, and would be unable to survive
in nature, were we to set them free. If exposed to life in
the wild-bitter winters, savage predators, etc.-farm
animals would be likely to die slowly and painfully from
starvation, or quickly and savagely at the hands of
wolves and bear. As long as we follow Frey's concerned
individual's tactic and reform our farming practices to
give animals long and peaceful lives, we are actually
doing them a favor. A life that is overall pleasurable,
even though it might contain some pain, is preferable
to no life at all, which is the likely consequence of
ending meat farming.
This "animal husbandry" argument can draw support
from an unexpected source: 1. Baird Callicott's defense
of a "land ethic." He criticizes supporters of animal
rights for ignoring the vital distinction between wild
and domestic animals. lO He argues that none of the
likely outcomes of our ceasing to raise animals for meat
are favorable to the animals themselves. Unused to
fending for themselves in competition with other wild
animals, domestic animals are likely to become extinct,
and we might consider it more humane simply to allow

how human gains from meat eating outweigh nonhuman suffering. I will focus mainly on R.G. Frey's
justification of meat eating in his book, Rights, Killing,
and Suffering. s Frey takes Singer's challenge seriously
and gives a careful, detailed response..
Frey defends the strategy of the "concerned
individual," who continues to eat meat but tries to
reform farming techniques in order to eliminate cruelty
to farm animals. He argues that Singer's demand for
the end of factory farming is based on the implausible
"single experience" view of suffering: meat eating is
wrong if it causes any suffering at all to farm animals.
Frey proposes that we adopt instead the "miserable life"
view of suffering, according to which we may be
justified in causing animals some pain in order to raise
them for food, as long as we ensure that their lives are
on balance more pleasant than painful. He points out
that the "single experience" view of suffering would
almost certainly have the absurd consequence that
raising human children would also be wrong, since it
would be practically impossible' to eliminate all
suffering from their lives.6
Frey is correct when he argues that the "miserable
life" view of suffering is sup'erior to the "single
experience" view. However, his argument neglects a
third option that is more salutary than either of the ones
he considers. I will call this third option the "minimal
suffering" view. Granted, the "single experience" view
is too stringent, but his "miserable life" view has the
opposite fault of being too lenient. It is itself vulnerable
to a reductio: it would justify even the gratuitous
infliction of suffering on our children, as long as the
suffering is just barely outweighed by the pleasure they
experience. Far more plausible is my "minimal
suffering" view, which permits the infliction of suffering
only when doing so prevents even greater suffering or
when it is a deserved punishment for past behavior.
Abusing children (while carefully ensuring that their
overall happiness outweighs their suffering) is
repugnant, because it does not serve any legitimate
punitive purpose or prevent even greater long-term
suffering, either for our children or ourselves. Similarly,
the suffering caused to animals when we raise them
for meat is justified only if they deserve it (which is
clearly not the case) or if it helps to prevent even
greater suffering. Consequently, the burden is on Frey
to show what the benefits of continuing to raise
animals for meat are and how they outweigh the
suffering caused to animals.
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animals for food. In any event, the animal husbandry
argument has been neutralized, since its goal was to
show that meat farming is beneficial to animals, and
we have seen that the replacement of farm animals by
wild animals would create at least as much happiness
as is currently experienced by farm animals. 16
Moreover, even if we concede that domestic animals
have no natural instincts that could be violated, our
utilitarian approach still favors a world in which wild
animals flourish in the place of domestic animals, since
animals that both have a nature and live in nature
arguably have richer, more fulfilling lives.
Those who go beyond the utilitarian framework used
in this paper can further criticize the confmement of
animals on meat farms by citing Regan's view that
raising animals on farms violates their inherent value,
by treating them only as a means. Even though he
rejects Singer's and Regan's approach, Callicott
himself gives a nonutilitarian reason against factory
farming, namely that it involves "the monstrous
transformation of living things from an organic to a
mechanical mode of being." 17
The foregoing discussion suggests that nonhuman
animals would be better off if we completely ended meat
farming than if we followed the tactic of Frey's
concerned individual. Consequently, the justifiability
of the concerned individual's lactic hinges on showing
that the benefits for humans of continuing to raise
animals for meat outweigh its disutility for nonhumans.
Let us tum at last to Frey's main argument.
Frey bases his utilitarian defense of meat farming
on a detailed conjecture as to the bad economic
consequences for humans of its cessation. is Frey
predicts a massive loss of income and employment,
not only for farmers but also for the vast number of
people in meat-related industries. He also includes the
loss of pleasure resulting from a decrease in such social
activities as restaurant-going and barbecues. Since
space does not permit detailed discussion of Frey's
specific predictions, I will confine myself to a few
general responses.
First, Frey's argument is based on worst-case
scenarios which underestimate the new economic and
social opportunities that will arise because of the need
for enormously greater production of vegetarian food.
For instance, the growing popularity of vegetarianism
in the United States and, especially, in England has led
to a profusion of vegetarian restaurants, and most
restaurants now offer vegetarian options. These

existing fann animals to die peacefully on fanns than
to put them at the mercy of predators. Callicott
comments on the irony of the liberation of domestic
animals resulting in their extinction. ll
I follow Bart Gruzalski in biting the bullet in
response to this reductio ad absurdum argument. 12 The
discontinuation ofmeat farming will likely result in the
replacement of domestic by wild animals. But this is
an advantage, since it will result in an increase in the
total amount of pleasure experienced by nonhuman
animals. First, even if the adoption of Frey's concerned
individual's tactic makes domestic animals' lives
pleasurable, this pleasure will be replaced by that of
the additional wild animals that will flourish on the land
previously used for grazing on farms. i3 Second, wild
animals live more pleasurable lives than domestic ones.
Gruzalski points out that no amount of modification of
our current farming practices will eliminate the
frustration of animals' natural urges and instincts, in
terms of movement, social organization, and diet. Thus,
it isn't clear that animals raised in the manner proposed
by Frey's "concerned individual" have lives that are on
balance pleasurable. In contrast, while wild animals can
indeed suffer painful "natural" deaths from predators,
these deaths at least avoid the additional terror caused
by the unfamiliar environment of the slaughterhouse.
And some wild animals die peacefully of old age, thus
avoiding any terror at all.
We still need to address another of Callicott's
objections, which is also based on the distinction
between domestic and wild animals. Arguments (such
as Gruzalski's) that claim that meat fanning frustrates
animals' "natural desires" neglect the fact that "human
artifacts" such as domestic animals do not hflve a nature
that can be violated.

It would make almost as much sense to speak
of the natural behavior of tables and chairS. 14
In response, Gruzalski cites experts who believe that
the natural, instinctive urges and behavioral
patterns...of... ancestral wild species have
been little, if at all, bred out in the process of
domestication. 15
In the face of this stalemate on the nature of domestic
animals, we may reasonably err on the side of caution
and place the burden of proof on those who would use
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developments indicate that the gloomy predictions that
Frey made twelve years ago about the future of the
restaurant industry if meat eating were to be abandoned
were unfounded. The fact that even MacDonalds bas
developed a vegetarian burger, and that supermarkets
now stock a wide variety of different types of non-meat
burgers and hot dogs, undermines Frey's claim that fast
food restaurants would collapse and shows that
barbecues could continue even if we gave up meat. More
generally, Frey's claim that all vegetarian restaurants
are alike reflects the common myth that vegetarian
cuisine is bland, a charge that is already belied by the
imaginative menus available in such restaurants.
Second, even granting that conversion to vegetarianism would cause some economic bardship, and
granting Frey's point that this hardship is commen·
surable with animals' suffering,19 economic factors are
unlikely to outweigb the physical and mental suffering
that would remain for farm animals even if we reformed
farming methods. By analogy, even a purely utilitarian
approach, which forswears any reference to rights,
would certainly not accept the economic arguments that
could doubtless bave been made in favor of child labor
in the 19th. century. The children's suffering outweighs
any financial gains that might bave arisen from
exploiting this source of cbeap or free labor.
Tbird, a consistent utilitarian approacb must
consider not only the potentially bannful effects for
bumans of giving up raising animals for meat but also
its potential benefits for us. As well as the health benefits
arising from giving up meat, we must take into account
the fact that, as a far more efficient source of protein
than a meat-based diet, a vegetarian diet may belp
substantially to alleviate the problem of world hunger. 2o
Now, Frey is aware of these arguments based on buman
welfare,21 and, reasonably enough, be decides to focus
instead on arguments based on animal welfare, since
these arguments bave "recently given the question of
vegetarianism a new focus."22 The problem for Frey is
that tbe alleged harmful effects for bumans of
vegetarianism playa vital role in bis response to the
argument for vegetarianism basedon animals' suffering.
The structure of his argument is that, since the concerned
individual's tactic is effective in reducing animals'
suffering, the harmful effects for humans of giving up
meat farming are sufficient to tilt the utilitarian balance
against vegetarianism. Consequently, any beneficial
effects of vegetarianism for bumans are also directly
relevant to Frey's utilitarian defense of meat farming,
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yet be does not include these effects in bis discussion
of consequences. Only if be can sbow that the benefits
for humans of meat farming outweigb its disutility for
animals arul/or humans has be successfully responded
to Singer's utilitarian argument defended in this paper.
In sum, Frey's argument, even if supplemented by
the animal busbandry argument, fails to overcome the
utilitarian case against raising animals for meat Neither
bis contention that it will sufficiently reduce animals'
suffering, nor bis argument that it will have better results
for humans than vegetarianism, have succeeded in
making the case for the concerned individual's strategy.
Consequently, the only certainties are that today's meat
farming causes the animals considerable suffering and
that discontinuing meat farming will end that suffering.
3. Human Supremacism

We bave seen that meat eating is bard to justify on
utilitarian grounds. Once we concede that the moral
interests of nonhumans sbould be given equal weigbt
alongside those of bumans in our moral deliberations,
buman gains from meat eating appear trivial compared
to animals' losses. At this point, many defenders ofmeat
eating take a different tack and withdraw their assent
from Singer's application of the equal consideration of
interests principle to nonhumans. According to this
position, wbich I call "buman supremacism," bumans'
interests sbould count for more than those of nonbumans, making utilitarian comparisons of human and
nonhuman gains and losses inappropriate.
The issue at stake between utilitarian vegetarians
sucb as Singer and, on the other hand, buman
supremacists is wbether the morality of meat eating
depends on a quantitative comparison between the gains
and losses of humans and animals. Singer believes that
it does and argues that giving preference to bumans in
spite of animals' greater interests is speciesist and,
therefore, wrong. Human supremacists, in contrast,
claim that a qualitative comparison is also needed.
Because humans bave greater inherent moral value than
nonbumans, human interests should take precedence
over those of animals. I devote this section to an
examination of one such buman supremacist view, that
of Carl Coben, who brazenly embraces the label of
speciesist. His paper concerns medical experiments on
animals, but I will consider its implications for
vegetarianism.23 Cohen himself clearly believes that bis
argument justifies meat eating, since he offers as a
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reductio ad absurdum of arguments against medical
research on animals the consequence that meat eating
would also be wrong. 24
Speciesism is not analogous to racism and sexism,
Cohen argues, because whereas no morally relevant
distinctions exist between the races and sexes, the
morally relevant differences between humans and
nonhumans are "enormous, and almost universally
appreciated.,,25 Now, Singer would not deny that
humans, because of their greater intelligence, have
greater interests than do nonbumans. The equal
consideration of interests principle requires not equal
treatment but, rather, that like interests be given equal
weigbt. Consequently, in situations in which bumans'
and nonhumans' interests clasb, bumans' greater
interests will sometimes justify giving them preference.
For example, since "[n]orrnal adult buman beings bave
mental capacities that will, in certain circumstances,
lead them to suffer more than animals would in the same
circumstances,"26 we may sometimes be more justified
in performing scientific experiments on nonhumans
tban on bumans. Singer opposes meat farming,
bowever, because our benefits are easily outweigbed
by animals' suffering.
In contrast, Coben flatly denies that "the pains of
all animate beings must be counted equally"27 and
even that nonhumans bave any rigbts at all. On wbat
qualities does Coben base bumans' alleged greater
inberent moral value?
Coben believes that only beings that are capable of
both claiming their own and respecting other beings'
rigbts are eligible for baving rigbts:

sense that no animal bas a right to be treated in this
way. Coben does not explain exactly what the extent of
our imperfect obligations to animals is. At one point,
be refers to the duty not to gratuitously barm sentient
creatures. On the interpretation of "gratuitous" that I
assume Cohen intends, this would rule out torturing
animals for our pleasure but would permit virtually any
of the currently cornmon uses of nonhumans, including
meat eating and medical experiments. However,
defenders of animal rights regard most of these cornmon
practices as gratuitous, because the sacrifices imposed
on nonhumans are not outweighed by human gains.
Consequently, Cohen's view, whatever its other merits,
fails to give a clear criterion for determining which uses
of nonhumans are justified.
To his credit, Cohen deals directly with the most
obvious objection to his account of rights. The objection,
the so-called "argument from marginal cases," is that
very young, severely retarded, or comatose bumans
would also fail to qualify if being able to exercise and
respond to moral claims is a necessary condition for
baving rights. 29 They are not moral agents, since they
are unable to reciprocate any moral concern that we
show towards them, nor are they able even to understand
any moral claims that may be made on their own behalf.
But we do regard them as having rights, and we punish
people, sucb as child abusers, wbo violate these rights. 30
Coben's response is that qualification for rights
depends upon the "natural moral functions" of the
species. Members that, due to youth, birth defects or
accidents, do not bave these capacities are, as it were,
carried through on the coattails of the rest of the species.

Humans confront cboices that are purely
moral; bumans-but certainly not dogs or
mice-lay down moral laws, for others and
for themselves. Human beings are selflegislative, morally auto-nomous... Animals
(that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense
of that word) lack this capacity for free moral
judgment. Tbey are not beings of a kind
capable of exercising or responding to moral
claims. Animals therefore bave no rigbts ...28

The capacity for moral judgment that distinguisbes bumans from animals is not a test to
be administered to buman beings one by
one...The issue is one of kind. 31
All nonhuman animals, in contrast, simply lack the
capacities that most bumans have. The first problem
with Coben's respon~ is that, while it produces the
result be desires-bumans bave rigbts, and nonhurnans
don't-it amounts to an assertion rather than an
argument. Exactly why sbould rigbts be based on the
normal capacities of a species rather than on the
capacities of eacb individual member? Second, his view
seems to entail an absurd consequence. Suppose that
one of the cbimpanzees that bave been taught sign
language develops an ability to understand moral

Cohen does not deny that we do bave duties towards
nonhumans, even thougb they have no rigbts. In
particular, we "are at least obliged to act bumanely"
towards animals, in view of their status as sentient
creatures. But these obligations are imperfect, in the
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that we give preference to humans in these rare
situations. The moral community is strengthened when,
other things being equal, we give priority to beings
capable of reciprocating our moral concern. And when
either a human or a nonhuman has to suffer physically
or die, humans' greater capacity for suffering will
usually tilt the utilitarian balance in their favor.
The situation is completely different when we
consider the utilities involved in the debate over meat
eating. Since we do not need meat to survive, we are
not faced with the choice of imposing comparable
suffering on either humans or nonhumans, and so
humans' greater capacities are irrelevant to the tradeoff
ofinterests involved. As we saw in the previous section,
a quantitative comparison of rival interests shows that
human gains are insufficient to justify the imposition
of suffering on noubumans. So, the only way to justify
continuing to raise animals for food is to abandon the
utilitarian approach that gives equal weight to the like
interests of humans and nonhumans. But we have just
seen that Cohen has failed to give a cogent reason for
abandoning the utilitarian approach and regarding
human interests as qualitatively more important than
those of nonhumans. Consequently, the human
supremacist approach fails to dislodge our earlier
conclusion that raising animals for food is wrong.

arguments, to restrain its behavior in the light of these
arguments, and to make moral claims on its own behalf.
These abilities would remain far above the "natural
moral functions" of chimpanzees as a species.
Consequently, according to the view that bases rights
upon the normal capacities of the species as a whole,
this chimpanzee would have to be denied the status of
a right-holder. But this seems arbitrary and unfair.
None of this is to deny that humans' greater
capacities sometimes give rise to special moral
obligations towards them. For instance, because of their
ability to make and respond to moral claims, I am able
to make agreements and promises and to enjoy deep,
mutually supportive relationships with healthy humans
that are difficult or impossible with nonhumans or
"marginal" humans. These agreements, promises and
relationships make our moral ties to healthy adult
humans more extensive and complex than those we have
to nonhumans. But this does not preclude nonbumans
from having rights, any more than the fact that I have
special moral obligations towards some people, such
as my friends and family members, precludes strangers
from having moral rights that I treat them certain ways.
Since I am defending Singer's utilitarian view, my
response to Cohen is not intended to show that animals
have rights. My point, rather, is that nonhumans have
as much claim to baving rights as do humans and that
the existence of special obligations towards healthy
adult humans does not entail human supremacism.
Similarly, I can concede other justified differences
between the moral standing ofhealthy adult humans and
nonbumans, without resorting to human supremacism.
The view that only self-conscious beings capable of
future-oriented desires, especially the desire for continued
life, can have a tight ro life 32 can be justified on the
utilitarian ground that persons' greater mental capacities,
including their greater power of anticipation, mean that
they would lose more than nonpersons from being killed.
These human capacities that are not shared by
nonhumans--e.g., the ability to make and respect moral
claims and to form extensive future-oriented desireswill sometimes act as a "tie-breaker" that justifies giving
preference to humans-for instance, if we bad to choose
between feeding humans or a dog in a time of extreme
shortage. However, the justification for giving
preference to humans has nothing to do with humans'
alleged greater inherent moral worth. It is, rather, that
giving equal weight to the like interests of humans and
nonhumans, an impartial utilitarian calculus requires
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4. Conclusion: Tbeory and Practice
I have argued that the strongest utilitarian defense of
raising animals for meat-Frey's-does not work and
that the human supremacist attempt to sidestep
utilitarian calculations by attributing greater intrinsic
moral worth to humans is unfounded. However, even
if we accept that the discontinuation of raising animals
for meat would have better results than following the
concerned individual's tactic, Frey points out that a
crucial step remains to be provided before any utilitarian
argument can condemn meat eating. This step is
showing that the act of becoming a vegetarian and
encouraging others to do so will actually help to achieve
the goal of the abolition of meat farming and, hence,
produce better results than the concerned individual's
tactic. Frey argues that the practical impact of anyone
person's becoming a vegetarian will be negligible, given
the vastness of the meat industry in countries like the
In contrast, political action in order to reform
farming practices to reduce animals' suffering is far
more likely to produce tangible benefits.

u.s,33
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In response, the private action of becoming a
vegetarian in no way precludes political activism of
precisely the kind that Frey supports. The only
difference is that the activism would aim at the abolition,
rather than the reform, of raising animals for meat.
Additionally, while my becoming a vegetarian may have
negligible effect, Frey dismisses too easily the impact
of the combined effect of thousands of people's
becoming vegetarians. Given the dramatic increase in
vegetarian restaurants and vegetarian options within
conventional restaurants in the twelve years since Frey's
book appeared, we may plausibly claim that conversion
to vegetarianism really has reduced the amount ofmeat
that would otherwise have been produced and
consumed. Finally, as vegetarianism becomes more
"mainstream," it gains more credibility and power as
a political force.
My second response to Frey concerns the morality
of eating today's meat, the vast majority of which is
raised on the very factory farms that he wants to reform.
A great strength ofFrey's book is that he gives a detailed
and sophisticated discussion ofthe charges ofinsincerity
and inconsistency that we might level at the concerned
individual, who, while campaigning for reform,
continues to eat meat raised in a manner that he or she
concedes causes unfair suffering to animals. 34 Frey
responds plausibly enough by pointing out that
demanding that we have absolutely no contact with a
practice that we consider wrong is unduly rigid. For
instance, I can quite actively and consistently oppose
my country's foreign policies, without leaving the
country in order to express the extent ofmy disapproval.
Similarly, argues Frey, as long as the concerned
individual actively strives to reform cruel farming
practices, the fact that she continues to eat meat is proof
of neither insincerity nor inconsistency.
However, continuing to eat meat while striving for
reform is different in a crucial respect from Frey's
analogies. Remaining in a country and trying to change
its policies from within is arguably far more effective
than simply leaving the country and having no contact
with it. In contrast, continuing to eat meat seems to have
no positive impact on the effectiveness of the concerned
individual's attempt to end cruel farming practices. On
the contrary, a reduction in the demand for meat (which
is the likely result of a temporary boycott by concerned
individuals) would seem to create economic pressure
on the meat industry that is likely to accelerate the
desired reforms. Once the reforms have occurred, the
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concerned individual may then resume eating meat. So
even the concerned individual is not justified in eating
meat raised on today's factory farms. The concerned
individual who continues to eat meat, even though she
admits that it was produced in cruel conditions and that
her eating meat will in no way enhance her efforts to
improve these cruel conditions, seems to be guilty of a

lack ofintegrity.
In conclusion, my utilitarian argument that raising
animals for meat is wrong does indeed demand a
vegetarian diet. And even if Frey were correct that trying
to reform our practice ofraising animals for meat would
have better consequences than working for its abolition,
eating the meat raised on today's factory farms would
still not be justified on utilitarian grounds.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee, commentatorAlex Wellington, Harlan Miller, and audience
members for helpful suggestions.
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